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Abstract
We propose a new reasoning protocol called gen-
eralized recursive reasoning (GR2), and embed
it into the multi-agent reinforcement learning
(MARL) framework. The GR2 model defines
reasoning categories: level-0 agent acts randomly,
and level-k agent takes the best response to a
mixed type of agents that are distributed over level
0 to k−1. The GR2 leaners can take into account
the bounded rationality, and it does not need the
assumption that the opponent agents play Nash
strategy in all stage games, which many MARL
algorithms require. We prove that when the level
k is large, the GR2 learners will converge to at
least one Nash Equilibrium (NE). In addition, if
lower-level agents play the NE, high-level agents
will surely follow as well. We evaluate the GR2
Soft Actor-Critic algorithms in a series of games
and high-dimensional environment; results show
that the GR2 methods have faster convergence
speed than strong MARL baselines.
1. Introduction
In the studies of multi-agent reinforcement learning
(MARL), one fundamental assumption is that agents will
behave rationally (Hu & Wellman, 2003; Shapley, 1953).
When interacting with others, perfect rationality stands for
the condition that an agent would hold correct beliefs about
other agents’ behaviors, and will only choose the actions that
maximize its utility function. In reality, however, agents’ ra-
tionality are often bounded by practical limitations (Simon,
1972), e.g. the imperfect precedents or the maintenance
cost. Such bounded rationality can lead to agent’s incorrect
estimation about the behaviors of others, thus deviate the
real behaviors considerably from the theoretical outcome.
In fact, in many real-world games, the assumption of per-
fect rationality cannot precisely predict agents’ behaviors
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(Moulin, 1986; Crawford et al., 2013; Gracia-La´zaro et al.,
2017). It becomes critical for MARL in acknowledging the
bounded rationality and enhancing the model capacity when
agents are not perfectly rational in the corresponding cases.
Under the rationality assumption, game theorist believe
agents’ behaviors will end up in some kind of an equilib-
rium state (Nash et al., 1950; Aumann, 1987). Following
this, MARL research is focused on considering the Nash
Equilibrium (NE) as the essential assumption in both the
learning algorithm and the evaluation criterion (Hu & Well-
man, 2003; Littman, 2001; Greenwald et al., 2003).
However, the justification of assuming agents are always
playing NE in multi-agent learning is untenable; and Nash
strategy does not always have the prescriptive force. One
most-cited psychological experiment that NE fails to de-
scribe is the Keynes Beauty Contest (Keynes, 1936). In
a simpler version, all players are asked to pick one num-
ber from 0 to 100, and the rule stipulates that the player
whose guess is closest to 1/2 of the average is the winner.
The theory of NE suggests that the only rational choice for
each player is 0 because all the players will reason as fol-
lows: “if all players guess randomly, the average of those
guesses would be 50 (level-0), I therefore should guess no
more than 1/2 ∗ 50 = 25 (level-1), and then if the other
players think similarly as me, I should guess no more than
1/2 ∗ 25 = 13 (level-2), ...”. The level of recursions can
keep developing until all players guess 0 that is the only NE
in this game. This theoretical result is however inconsistent
with the experimental finding which evidences that most
human players choose numbers between 13 and 25 (Cori-
celli & Nagel, 2009). The underlying mechanism is that not
all human players exhibit perfect rationality and they are
bounded by the levels they would like to recursively reason
with. An interesting finding is that even with a bounded
level of reasoning capability, human players can still even-
tually reach NE after a few rounds of playing and learning
in the game (Camerer, 2011).
Inspired by the above finding in behavioral game theory, in
this work, we propose a novel learning protocol – General-
ized Recursive Reasoning (GR2) – that acknowledges the
bounded rationality and requires no assumption that agents
must play Nash strategy for all the stage games encountered.
Following cognitive hierarchy theory (Camerer et al., 2004),
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GR2 develops a recursive model of reasoning by steps. In
GR2, agent types are drawn from a hierarchy of reasoning
capability with arbitrary thinking depth. It begins with level-
0 (L0 for short) type agents who do not assume anything
about the other agents. Level-1 thinkers believe all their
opponents are in level-0, level-2 thinkers believe all oppo-
nents are in either level-0 or level-1, and they take these
beliefs into consideration before making the best decision.
The GR2 agents are all self-interested in the sense of best
responding to their beliefs of others, i.e. level-k agents take
the best response to either level-k − 1 thinkers or a mixture
of agents with the level ranging from 0 to k − 1.
In this paper, we immerse the generalized recursive rea-
soning (GR2) protocol into the framework of MARL, and
develop the GR2 Soft Actor-Critic algorithm. Due to the
recognition of agents’ bounded rationality, the GR2 MARL
algorithm is adept at capturing the non-equilibrium behav-
iors in forming the correct expectations about others, and
ultimately it helps the convergence to the equilibrium. We
prove that when the level of reasoning is large, GR2 meth-
ods can converge to at least one NE. In addition, if the
lower-level agent plays Nash strategy, then all higher-level
agents will follow. We evaluate our methods against multi-
ple strong MARL baselines on the Keynes Beauty Contest
and matrix games. Results justify our assumption that the
GR2 method is able to incorporate the irrational behaviors
of opponents, because of which the learning algorithm GR2
induces can converge to the equilibrium much faster than
others. In the high-dimensional particle games, GR2 meth-
ods present superior performance over those baselines that
do not have recursive reasoning modules.
2. Related Work
Assigning agents with different levels of reasoning power,
aka, the level-k model, was first introduced by Stahl (1993);
Stahl II & Wilson (1994) and Nagel (1995). In the level-
k model, agents anchor their beliefs through thought-
experiments with iterated best response in a chain style,
i.e. L1 best responds to L0, L2 to L1, and so on. Agents’
levels are heterogeneous and are drawn from a common
distribution. It is expected that agent would exhibit a pattern
of behavior whose complexity grows as the cognitive levels
increases (Gracia-La´zaro et al., 2017). Interestingly, across
different games in the real world (Camerer et al., 2004; Ben-
ndorf et al., 2017), human beings tend to reason between 1 -
2 levels of recursion. This explains why people commonly
guess between 13 to 25 in the Keynes Beauty Contest (see
the previous section).
However, the level-k models are shown to exhibit extreme
stereotype bias due to concentrating on only one level below
(Chong et al., 2016). Camerer et al. (2004) extended the
level-k model by making the Lk best responds to not only
the level k − 1, but a mixture of lower types of agents as
well, and named it cognitive hierarchy model (CHM). The
mixture of lower hierarchy is usually approximated by a dis-
crete probability distribution, with its parameter estimated
from the empirical experimental data. CHM presents dis-
tinct advantages over the level-k model on making robust
predictions in a series of games (Crawford et al., 2013). Our
method, GR2, is inspired by CHM. We bring the idea of
mixing the cognitive hierarchy into the deep reinforcement
learning (RL) framework, and develop algorithms that could
both incorporate opponents’ non-equilibrium behaviors in
the games and converge to the NE faster. This is different
from the work (Hu & Wellman, 2003; Yang et al., 2018;
Wen et al., 2019) that the convergence to NE requires agents
to solve NE at each stage of the game.
GR2, modeling the opponents in a recursive manner, i.e. “I
believe how you would believe about how I believe”, can be
regarded as a special type of opponent modeling (Albrecht
& Stone, 2018). It was first introduced by game theorists
(Harsanyi, 1962; 1967). The study on Theory of Mind
(ToM) (Goldman et al., 2012; Rabinowitz et al., 2018) in-
troduced the uncertainty of the agent’s belief on opponents’
behaviors, their payoffs, and the recursion depths. Gmy-
trasiewicz & Doshi (2005) further implemented the idea
of ToM in the RL setting. It extends the POMDP (Sondik,
1971) by an extra dimension that models the opponent state.
Despite the added flexibility, I-POMDP has limitations in
its solvability (Seuken & Zilberstein, 2008). Haarnoja et al.
(2017) enables a hierarchical structure for agent policy, but
it is for single-agent case and needs layer-wise pre-training.
By contrast, we embed GR2 into the RL framework via
probabilistic inference. Levine (2018) built the connec-
tion between inferring the optimal policy in RL and the
probabilistic inference on graphical models. Within this
framework, Haarnoja et al. (2017; 2018) designed the soft
Q-learning and soft actor-critic methods. Grau-Moya et al.
(2018) and Wei et al. (2018) further generalized the soft
Q-learning to the multi-agent scenario; however, these meth-
ods optimize towards the optimal Q-function of the joint
actions; by doing this, it implies that the opponents will
always collaborate with the central agent to reach its best
equilibrium. However, forming the incorrect beliefs about
the opponents is detrimental in many real-world applications
(Albrecht & Stone, 2018).
Our GR2 method is most related to the probabilistic recur-
sive reasoning (PR2) method (Wen et al., 2019) that also
implement the idea of conducting recursive reasoning for
MARL tasks. However, PR2 only considers the case of
level-1 reasoning. Here we extend the recursion depth to
arbitrary number and design the learning protocol so that
agents can make the best response to a mixture of agents
that are at different reasoning levels. We believe recursive
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reasoning with higher-order beliefs could better incorporate
the non-equilibrium behavior during the game especially in
the places where the traditional theory of NE cannot explain
(e.g. the Keynes Beauty Contest). In the meantime, we also
show that GR2 have better convergence property.
3. Preliminaries
Our GR2 method is built upon the framework of n-
agent stochastic game (Shapley, 1953), denoted by
(S,A1, . . . ,An, r1, . . . , rn, p, γ), where S represents the
state space, p is the transition probability of the environ-
ment, γ is the discount factor for future rewards, Ai and
ri(s, ai, a−i) are the action space and the reward function
for agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} respectively. Agent i chooses
its action ai ∈ Ai based on its policy piiθi(ai|s), that is
parameterized by θi, and a−i = (aj)j 6=i represents its
opponents’ behaviors. Each agent tries to find the opti-
mal policy that maximizes its expected cumulative reward:
maxpiiθ V
i
piθ
(s) =
∑∞
t=0 γ
tEpiθ,p
[
ri
(
st, a
i
t, a
−i
t
) |s0, piθ] ,
with (ait, a
−i
t ) sampled from piθ = (pi
i
θi , pi
−i
θ−i). The
state-action Q-function for each agent i follows the Bell-
man equation as Qipiθ (st, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) = r
i(st, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) +
γEst+1∼p
[
V ipiθ (st+1)
]
. We define the trajectory by τ i =[
(s0, a
i
0, a
−i
0 , r
i
0), . . . , (st, a
i
t, a
−i
t , r
i
t)
]
, andDi to be the re-
ply buffer that stores those trajectories for agent i.
3.1. Nash Equilibrium
Agents are self-interested to learn only the optimal pol-
icy in the game. The variable Oi represents how opti-
mal agent i is at time t; it is proportional to the reward
P (Oit = 1|st, ait) ∝ exp(ri(st, ait, a−it )) (Levine, 2018).
In other words, Oi can describe how likely the trajectory τ i
will be observed, e.g. if agents were egocentric, altruism
actions are less likely to be observed. The optimal action
for agent i is then stated as p(ait|st, a−it ,Oit:T = 1).
The best response to the opponent policy pi−i is the policy
pii∗ s.t. V
i(s;pii∗, pi
−i) ≥ V i(s;pii, pi−i) for all valid pii.
When all the agents act in their best response, (pi1∗, . . . , pi
n
∗ )
forms a Nash Equilibrium (Nash et al., 1950).
3.2. Multi-Agent Soft Learning
Soft Q-learning, also called maximum entropy RL, is the
outcome if one applies variational inference to solve the
optimal policy on the graphical model of RL (Levine, 2018).
Compared to the normal Q-learning, it has one additional
entropy term in the objective. When the soft Q-learning is
adapted into the multi-agent case, the entropy term is instead
applied on the joint policy pi(ait, a
−i
t |st) (Grau-Moya et al.,
2018). The soft value function therefore reads as follows:
V i(s) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
ri(st, a
i
t, a
−i
t ) +H
(
pi(ait, a
−i
t |st)
)]
.
(1)
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Figure 1: Graphical model of the level-k recursive reason-
ing. Note that the subfix a∗ here stands for the level of
thinking not the timestep. The unobservable opponent poli-
cies are approximated by ρ−i. The omitted level-0 model
considers opponents fully randomized. Agent i rolls out the
recursive reasoning about opponents in its mind (grey area).
In the recursion, agents with higher-level beliefs take the
best response to the lower-level thinkers’ actions. Higher-
level models would conduct all the computations that the
lower-level models have done, e.g. level-2 contains level-1.
For policy evaluation, a modified Bellman operator T pi
can be applied, T piQi(st, ait, a−it ) , ri(st, ait, a−it ) +
γEst+1,ait+1∼p,pii
[
log
∫
exp(Qi(st+1, a
i
t+1, a
−i
t+1)) da
−i
t+1
]
.
Compared to the max operator in the Bellman equation for
V i(s) in the case without the entropy term, it is soft because
V i (st) = log
∫
exp
(
Qi (st, at)
)
dat ≈ maxat Q (st, at).
Correspondingly, the independent policy pii(ai|s) can be
learned by minimizing DKL
(
pii
(
ai|s) || exp (Qi(s, ai))),
which leads to the Soft RL (Haarnoja et al., 2017; 2018).
However, policy improvement becomes tricky in the multi-
agent soft Q-learning because the Q-function guides the im-
provement direction for the joint policy rather than for each
individual agent. One naive approach is to discard the op-
ponents actions sampled from the joint policy pi(ait, a
−i
t |st)
and take the marginalized output (Wei et al., 2018).
3.3. Probabilistic Recursive Reasoning
PR2 (Wen et al., 2019) adopted the so-called correlated
factorization on the joint policy, i.e. pi(ai, a−i|s) =
pii(ai|s)pi−i(a−i|s, ai), where pi−i(a−i|s, ai) represents
the level-1 reasoning process of the opponent’s consider-
ation of the action from agent i. PR2 approximates the
actual opponent conditional policy pi−i via a best-fit model
ρ−iφ−i from a family of distributions parameterized by φ
−i.
Through variational inference, the optimal opponent condi-
tional policy in PR2 Q-learning is described to be
Multi-Agent Generalized Recursive Reasoning
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Figure 2: Reasoning paths of the level-k policy.
ρ−iφ−i(a
−i|s, ai) ∝ exp (Qipiθ (s, ai, a−i)−Qipiθ (s, ai)) .
(2)
Based on the optimal opponent model given by Eq. 2,
agent i can learn the best response policy pii(ai|s)
according to the optimal Q-function: Qi(s, ai) =∫
a−i ρ
−i
φ−i(a
−i|s, ai)Qi(s, ai, a−i) da−i. Together with the
Bellman equation for policy evaluation on Eq. 1, PR2 is
proved to converge to the unique NE.
4. Generalized Recursive Reasoning
Our goal is to develop more generalized and flexible recur-
sive reasoning into MARL. In this section, we first introduce
the protocol of level-k recursive reasoning (GR2-L), and
then propose a mixture model that takes into account agents
with different hierarchical levels of policies (GR2-M).
4.1. Level-k Recursive Reasoning
We start by constructing a level-k recursive reasoning pro-
cess, naming it GR2-L. A level-k policy for agent i is the
best response to the opponents’ policy at level k − 1 (see
Fig. 1). We assume pi−i is not directly observable, and
agents have to approximate it by ρ−i. The models on ai
and a−i can be regarded as latent variable model, with the
marginal policies pii(ai|s), ρ−i(a−i|s) serving as the prior,
and the conditional policies pii(ai|s, a−i), ρ−i(a−i|s, ai)
as the posterior. Actions can be sampled in a sequential
manner. The level-k policy is therefore constructed by inte-
grating over best responses from all lower-level policies,
piik(a
i
k|s) ∝
∫
a−i
k−1
da−ik−1
{
piik(a
i
k|s, a−ik−1)
·
∫
ai
k−2
daik−2
[
ρ−ik−1(a
−i
k−1|s, aik−2)piik−2(aik−2|s)
] }
. (3)
From agent i’s perspective, it believes that the oppo-
nents will take the best response to its own (fictitious)
action aik−2 that are two levels below: ρ
−i
k−1(a
−i
k−1|s) =∫
ρ−ik−1(a
−i
k−1|s, aik−2)piik−2(aik−2|s) daik−2, even though
the beliefs, ρ−i, that agent i holds for its opponents might
be inaccurate yet. piik−2 can be further expanded recursively
until meeting pi0 that is assumed uniformly distributed. For
brevity, we mostly omit the subscript level k in actions
a from now on while acknowledging that the actions in
the lower level are imagined (fictitiously taken). Consider-
ing the computational feasibility, we assume that each of
the agents adopts the same functional form for its policy
across the reasoning process in different depths; as shown
in Fig. 1, we maintain piik = pi
i
k+2, k = {1, 3, 5, ...}, and
ρ−ik = ρ
−i
k+2, k = {2, 4, 6, ...}.
4.2. Mixture of Hierarchy Recursive Reasoning
While the level-k policy assumes agents best respond to the
level k − 1 opponents, we can further generalize the model
to let agent best respond to a mixture of agents that are
distributed over the lower hierarchies. We name it GR2-M.
We assume that the level-k agents have an accurate guess
about the relative proportion of agents who are doing less
thinking than them. This specification implies that even
though the agent could maintain an inaccurate belief on the
probability distribution of the agents’ recursive depths, as k
increases, the deviation between agent’s belief and the actual
distribution profile of k will shrink. This further suggests
that when k is very large, there is no benefit for level-k
thinkers to reason even harder, as they will have the same
beliefs, subsequently make the same decisions as agents at
k + 1. Since more steps of computations are required as
the k grows, it is reasonable to make such assumption so
that with the increasing k, fewer agents are willing to do the
reasoning beyond k. Such assumption can also be justified
by the limited amount of working memory in the strategic
thinking on human beings (Devetag & Warglien, 2003).
In order to meet this assumption, we model the proportion of
recursive depth by the Poisson distribution f(k) = e
−λλk
k! ,
where the mean, also the variance, of the distribution is λ. A
nice property of Poisson is that f(k)/f(k − 1) is inversely
proportional to k, which satisfies our previous assumption.
Interestingly, a study on humans suggests that on average
people tend to act with λ ≈ 1.5 (Camerer et al., 2004).
With the mixture of hierarchy modeled by Poisson, we can
now mix all k levels’ thinkings into one perception, and
build each agent’s belief on its opponents by
pii,λk :=
e−λ
Z
(
λ0
0!
pii0 +
λ1
1!
pii1 · · ·
λk
k!
piik
)
, (4)
where Z is a normalization term. In the reinforcement
learning framework to be shown later, λ can be set as a
hyper-parameter, similar to the TD-λ (Tesauro, 1995). Note
that GR2-L is in fact a special case of GR2-M. When the
mixture of depth is Poisson distributed, we have f(k −
1)/f(k−2) = λ/(k−1); the model will put heavy weights
on the k − 1 level if λ  k; that is to say, a level-k agent
will act as if all the opponents are reasoning at level k − 1.
4.3. Nash Convergence when k →∞
Even though GR2-M does not intentionally move towards
Nash Equilibrium as the target, we present the main theorem
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Figure 3: Inter-level policy improvement. Higher-order strategies should weakly dominant lower-order strategies, e.g. with
the opponent behaviors a−ik−1 unchanged, a
i
k should perform at least as good as a
i
k−2, a
i
k−4, . . . , a
i
1.
that in the extreme case when the level k goes to∞, GR2-M
will reach at least one NE. We start by the proposition that
Proposition 1. In both the GR2-L & GR2-M model, if the
agents play pure strategies, once level-k agent reaches a
Nash Equilibrium, all higher-level agents will follow it too.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
In GR2, since high-order thinkers will always conduct at
least the same amount of computations as the lower-order
thinkers, with Prop. 1, we can have the corollary that
Corollary 1. In both GR2-L & GR2-M, higher-order strate-
gies weakly dominant lower-order strategies (see Fig. 3).
Theorem 1. In the GR2-M model, if the agents play the
pure strategy, as k → ∞, the prediction of GR2-M will
reach at least one Nash Equilibrium (if it exists).
Proof: See Appendix B. 
The property of converging to NE enables GR2-M not only
to model the non-equilibrium behaviors in the games, but
also to induce multi-agent learning algorithms that can po-
tentially be more efficient.
5. Multi-Agent GR2 Reinforcement Learning
In this section, we incorporate the GR2 models into the
MARL, in particular the framework of soft learning in
Sec. 3.2, and propose the GR2 Soft Actor-Critic algorithm.
5.1. GR2 Soft Actor-Critic Algorithm
To evaluate the level-k policy, since agent i cannot access the
joint soft Qi(s, ai, a−i) as it depends on the exact opponent
policies pi−i that are unknown, we instead compute the
independent soft Qi(s, ai) by marginalizing the joint Q-
function via the estimated opponent model ρ−iφ−i :
Qi(s, ai) =
log
∫
ρ−iφ−i(a
−i|s, ai) exp (Qi(s, ai, a−i)) da−i. (5)
With the marginalized Qi(s, ai), combining with the soft
value function defined in Eq. 1, we can obtain the value
function of the level-k policy piik(a
i|s) by
V i(s) = Eai∼piik
[
Qi(s, ai)− log piik(ai|s)
]
. (6)
Algorithm 1 GR2-L/M Soft Actor-Critic Algorithm
Set hyper-parameter λ, k and ψ (learning rates).
Initialize θi, φ−i, ωi for each agent i.
Assign target parameters: ω¯i ← ωi.
Di ← empty replay buffer for each agent i.
for each episode do
for each step t do
For each agent i, sample action ai according to
piiθi,k(s) in Eq. 3 or pi
i,λ
θi,k(s) in Eq. 4.
Sample next state: s′ ∼ p (s′|s, ai, a−i).
Add the tuple (s, ai, a−i, ri, s′) to Di.
for each agent i do
Sample {(s′j , aij , a−ij , rij , s′j)}Mj=0 ∼ Di.
Roll out policy from level 0→ k to get ai′j ,
with each level take the best response.
Record inter-level results (ai′j,k, a
−i′
j,k−1, · · · )
for auxiliary objective in Eq. 11.
Sample a−i′j ∼ ρ−iφ−i(·|s′j , ai′j ) for each ai′j , s′j .
ωi ← ωi − ψQi∇ˆωiJQi(ωi).
θi ← θi − ψpii∇ˆθi
(
Jpiik(θ
i) + Jpii
k˜
(θi)
)
.
φ−i ← φ−i − ψρ−i∇ˆφ−iJρ−i(φ−i).
end for
Update target network for each agent i:
ω¯i ← ψtargetωi + (1− ψtarget)ω¯i.
end for
end for
Each agent rolls out the recursive reasoning to level k, either
through GR2-L or through GR2-M, and then sample the
best response. With the value function in Eq. 6, we can train
the parameter ωi of the joint softQ-function via minimizing
the soft Bellman residual,
JQi(ω
i) = (7)
E(s,ai,a−i)∼Di
[
1
2
(
Qiωi(s, a
i, a−i)− Qˆi(s, ai, a−i)
)2]
,
where s′ is next state, and
Qˆi(s, ai, a−i) = ri(s, ai, a−i) + γEs′∼p
[
V i(s′)
]
. (8)
The level-k policy parameter θi can be learned by the fol-
lowing objective, which is in fact equivalent to minimizing
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the KL divergence between piiθi,k and Q
i
ωi(s, a
i) (Haarnoja
et al., 2017):
Jpii
k
(θi) = E s∼Di,
aik∼piiθi,k
[
log piiθi,k(a
i|s)−Qiωi(s, ai)
]
, (9)
In the multi-agent soft learning setting, the optimal opponent
model still ρ−i follows Eq. 2. We can therefore update
φ−i by minimizing the KL-divergence between the current
estimated policy ρ−iφ−i and the advantage function:
Jρ−i(φ
i) = DKL
[
ρ−iφ−i(a
−i|s, ai)∥∥∥ exp (Qiωi(s, ai, a−i)−Qiωi(s, ai)) ]. (10)
In practice, we can maintain two approximated Q-functions
of Qiωi(s, a
i, a−i) and Qiωi(s, a
i) separately, and then iter-
atively update the ρiφ−i via SVGD (Haarnoja et al., 2017;
Liu & Wang, 2016).
We summarize the whole algorithm in Algo. 1.
5.2. Inter-level Policy Improvement
As pointed out by Corollary. 1, higher-level policy should
respond at least as good as lower-level policy to the op-
ponent actions. In fact, the highest-level policy piik di-
rectly receives the feedback reward from the environment
and then back propagates it to lower level policies. The
intermediate level policy then receives the reward signal
through the chain. As shown in Fig. 3 , we shall have
Qi(s, ai
k˜
, a−i
k˜−1) ≥ Qi(s, aik˜−2, a
−i
k˜−1) for k˜ ≤ k. In order
to maintain this property, we introduce an auxiliary objective
during training, that is, for k˜ ≥ 2,
Jpii
k˜
(θi) = Es,(ai
k˜
,a−i
k˜
)∼Di,pii
θi,k
[
Qi(s, ai
k˜−2, a
−i
k˜−1)
−Qi(s, ai
k˜−2, a
−i
k˜−1)
]
(11)
As it is showed in the later section, such auxiliary objective
plays a critical role in helping the convergence.
5.3. Best Response as Deterministic Strategy
Considering the computational feasibility, we formulate the
best response in the form of deterministic strategy. Fig.
2 shows an example of the possible combination of paths
at the k-th level reasoning. As the reasonings process in-
volves iterated usages of pii(ai|s, a−i) and ρ−i(a−i|s, ai),
should they be stochastic policies, the cost of integrating
over actions from all possible lower level actions would be
unsustainable when k increases. Besides, the reasoning pro-
cess is affected by the stochasticity of the environment, the
variance will be further amplified on the stochastic policies.
Our approach to model the deterministic strategy is based on
the bijective transformation. Dinh et al. (2016) first applied
it on the deep generative models. Let a−i be the random
variable, by employing the change of variable rule, we have
piik
(
ai|s, a−i) = ρ−ik−1 (a−i|s)
∣∣∣∣∣det
(
dpiik
(
ai|s, a−i)
da−i
)∣∣∣∣∣
−1
.
(12)
The computation of the determinant can be further simplified
by choosing a special bijective transformations that have
friendly Jacobian matrix. For example, in the GR2-L model,
level-0 is usually assumed as uniformly distributed, we have:
Eai [pii1(ai|s)] = Eai
[
Ea−i
[
ρ−i0 (a
−i|s)pii1(ai|s, a−i)
]]
= Ea−i
[
ρ−i0 (a
−i|s)pii1(ai|s, a−i)
]
,
6. Experiments
We compare the proposed GR2-L/GR2-M Soft Actor-Critic
algorithm with a series of baselines including PR2 (Wen
et al., 2019), MASQL (Wei et al., 2018; Grau-Moya et al.,
2018), MADDPG (Lowe et al., 2017) and independent
learner via DDPG (Lillicrap et al., 2015). To compare
against traditional opponent modeling methods, similar to
(Rabinowitz et al., 2018; He et al., 2016), we implement
an additional baseline of DDPG with an opponent module
that is trained online with supervision in order to capture
the latest opponent behaviors, called DDPG-OM.
The Recursive Level. We regard DDPG, DDPG-OM,
MASQL, MADDPG as level-0 reasoning models because
from the policy level, they do not explicitly model the
impact of one agent’s action on the other agents or con-
sider the reactions from the other agents. Even though the
value function of the joint policy is learned in MASQL
and MADDPG, but they conduct a non-correlated factor-
ization (Wen et al., 2019) when it comes to each indi-
vidual agent’s policy. PR2 is in fact a level-1 reasoning
model, but note that the level-1 model in GR2 stands for
pii1(a
i|s) = ∫
a−i pi
i
1(a
i|s, a−i)ρ−i0 (a−i|s) da−i, while the
level-1 model in PR2 starts from the opponent’s angel, that
is ρ−i1 (a
−i|s) = ∫
ai
ρi1(a
−i|s, ai)pii0(ai|s) dai.
Experimental Settings. We describe k as the highest order
of reasoning in GR2-Lk and GR2-Mk. All the policies and
Q-functions are parameterized by the MLP with 2 hidden
layers, where each has 100 units with the ReLU activation.
In the Keynes Beauty Contest, we train all the methods
including the baselines for 400 iterations with 10 steps per
iteration. In the matrix game, we train the agents for 200
iterations with 25 steps per iteration. And for the particle
games, all the models are trained up to 300k steps with
maximum 25 episode length. In the actor-critic algorithms,
we set the exploration noise to 0.1 in the first 1000 steps.
The annealing parameters in soft algorithms are set to 0.5 to
balance the exploration/exploitation. We adopt k = 1, 2, 3
and set λ = 1.5, and leave the more detailed ablation study
on the hyper-parameter settings of k and λ in Appendix C.
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Table 1: The converged equilibrium on the Keynes Beauty Contest with different p and agent number n settings.
RECURSIVE DEPTH LEVEL 3 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 1 LEVEL 0
EQUILIBRIUM NASH GR2-L3 GR2-L2 GR2-L1 PR2 MADDPG DDPG-OM MASQL DDPG
p = 0.7, n = 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 10.6 8.7 8.3 18.6
p = 0.7, n = 10 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 9.8 18.1 12.0 8.7 30.2
p = 1.1, n = 10 100.0 97.6 94.2 92.2 64.0 68.2 61.7 87.5 52.2
Figure 4: Learning curves with or without the auxiliary loss
of Eq. 11
6.1. Keynes Beauty Contest
In the Keynes Beauty Contest game, all n agents pick a
number between 0 and 100. The winner is the agent whose
“guess” is closest to p times of the average number. The
reward is set as the absolute difference to the winner guess.
We evaluate the effect of reward shaping in Appendix. D.
We first conduct the experiments by setting different p and
n values. Table. 1 presents the results. We notice that the
GR2-L algorithms can effectively approach the equilibrium,
while the other baselines struggle to reach. We believe
it is because the level-0 methods are unable to model the
explicit dependency between agents’ actions, so that the
synergy of guessing smaller/larger together will not happen.
In addition, with the maximum level of recursive reasoning
grows, the equilibrium that GR2-Lk finds gets increasingly
closer to the true NE, which is expected. In the case of
p = 0.7, n = 2, the equilibrium is first reached by GR2-L1,
the other higher-order models follow the same equilibrium
afterwards; this is in line with the Proposition 1. The equi-
librium found by GR2-L3 is 97.6 when p = 1.1, the error is
due to the saturated reward design that stops the momentum
of agents’ changing the actions anywhere further.
Furthermore, we analyze the effectiveness of the auxiliary
loss in Eq. 11 that aims to guarantee the inter-level policy
improvement. In Fig. 4, we can find that although the GR2-
L model without auxiliary loss learns fast in the beginning,
it however fails to reach a better equilibrium. We believe
adding the auxiliary loss in the objective can help the joint
Q-function to guide a better direction for agents’ reasonings.
6.2. Learning Matrix Games
We then evaluate on two matrix games: Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) and Stag Hunt (SH). The reward matrix of PD is
RPD =
[
3, 3 1, 4
4, 1 2, 2
]
. Agents can choose to cooperate
(C) or defect (D). Defect is the dominant strategy for both
(a) Stag Hunt Game
(b) Prisoner’s Dilemma
Figure 5: Learning curves on the matrix games.
agents, while there exists a Pareto optima (C, C). In SH,
the reward matrix is RSH =
[
4, 4 1, 3
3, 1 2, 2
]
. Agents can
either cooperate to hunt the large stag (S) or to chase a small
rabbit (P) alone. In this game, there is no dominant strategy,
and it comes with two NEs, i.e. (S, S) that is also Pareto-
optimal, and the deficient equilibrium (P, P). To turn the
matrix games compatible with the actor-critic setting, we
make the actor output the probability of choosing one action
and define the reward based on the payoff matrix. We define
the state at time t to be st = (a1t−1, a
2
t−1).
In SH, we expect the agents to reach the Pareto optima, so
that both agents receive the maximum reward. Fig. 5a com-
pares the average training reward for a list of algorithms.
GR2-L/GR2-M models, together with PR2, can easily reach
the Pareto optima with maximum average return 4, whereas
other models are trapped into deficient equilibrium with
average return 2. On the convergence speed, higher-order
thinkers are faster than lower-order thinkers, and mixture
models are faster than level-k models. SH is a coordination
game that motivates players to cooperate, but the challeng-
ing part is the conflict between individual safety and social
welfare. Without knowing the choice of the other, GR2 has
to anchor the belief that opponents would like to choose
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Figure 6: Performance comparison between different models in the self-play competitive environments.
Figure 7: Performance comparison in the cooperative game.
the social welfare, and then reinforce this belief into the
high-order reasoning to finally build the trust among agents.
Since there is no dominant strategy in SH, agents will in
the end choose to stay fixed in that strategy. The level-0
methods cannot build such synergy because they cannot
discriminate the individual safety from the social welfare;
both NEs can saturate the value function of the joint action.
PD is different from SH in that there is a dominant strategy
of defection which leads the Pareto optima to be unstable.
In Fig. 5b, although GR2-L3 could reach the Pareto optima
within the first 50 steps, but soon it chooses to defect. Since
defection is dominant, as a level-2 thinker, it will surely
defect; such reasoning will be passed into the level-3 thinker,
and GR2-L3 soon realizes and best respond with defection
immediately. GR2-M3 under-performs GR2-L3 because
it is a mixture strategy, which still considers the level-1
thinker who still chases for cooperation. As for the rest of
the baselines, they do not present such behavioral changes
at all; meanwhile, they converge to a worse equilibrium.
6.3. Particle World Environments
We further adopt the Particle World Environments (Lowe
et al., 2017) to test our method on high-dimensional
state/action space scenarios. It includes four testing sce-
narios: 1) Cooperative Navigation with 3 agents and 3
landmarks. Agents are collectively rewarded based on the
proximity of any agent to each landmark while avoiding
collisions; 2) Physical Deception with 1 adversary, 2 good
agents, and 2 landmarks. All agents observe the positions
of landmarks and other agents. Only one landmark is the
true target landmark. Good agents are rewarded based on
how close any of them is to the target landmark, and how
well they deceive the adversary; 3) Keep-away with 1 agent,
1 adversary, and 1 landmark. Agent is rewarded based on
distance to landmark. Adversary is rewarded if it push away
the agent from the landmark; 4) Predator-prey with 1 prey
agent who moves faster try to run away from 3 adversary
predator who move slower but are motivated to catch the
prey cooperatively. Task 1 is fully-cooperative, while 2-4
are cooperative-competitive tasks.
We measure the performance of agents trained by differ-
ent algorithms in each of the environment. The results are
demonstrated in Figs. 6 & 7; we report the rewards of the
type of good agents and normalize them to 0-1 for tasks
2-4. We notice that in all the scenarios, the GR2-M methods
can achieve the highest score. The level-3 models can out-
perform the lower-level models. In the cooperative game,
the GR2-L/M methods have critical advantages over tradi-
tional baselines, this is inline with the finding in SH that
GR2 methods are good at finding the Pareto optimality.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, following the study of bounded rationality
(Simon, 1972) and behavior game theory (Camerer, 2003),
we introduce the protocol of generalized recursive reasoning
(GR2) that allows agents to have different levels of recur-
sive reasoning capability when dealing with other agents.
In GR2, each agent takes the best response to a mixed type
of agents that think and behave at lower levels. We inte-
grate GR2 into the MARL framework. The induced GR2
Soft Actor-Critic Algorithm shows superior performance on
building the correct beliefs about the opponents behaviors
even when they are non-equilibrium. We prove in theory
that GR2 can reach NE when the level approximates infinity.
Empirically, when compared to conventional opponent mod-
els (level 0), learning with higher level recursive reasoning
capability would lead to faster convergence.
Multi-Agent Generalized Recursive Reasoning
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